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Abstract
Crowdsourcing enables application developers to benefit from
large and diverse datasets at a low cost. Specifically, mobile
crowdsourcing (MCS) leverages users’ devices as sensors to
perform geo-located data collection. The collection of geo-
located data raises serious privacy concerns for users. Yet,
despite the large research body on location privacy-preserving
mechanisms (LPPMs), MCS developers implement little to
no protection for data collection or publication. To understand
this mismatch, we study the performance of existing LPPMs
on publicly available data from two mobile crowdsourcing
projects. Our results show that well-established defenses are
either not applicable or offer little protection in the MCS
setting. Additionally, they have a much stronger impact on
applications’ utility than foreseen in the literature. This is be-
cause existing LPPMs, designed with location-based services
(LBSs) in mind, are optimized for utility functions based on
users’ locations, while MCS utility functions depend on the
values (e.g., measurements) associated with those locations.
We finally outline possible research avenues to facilitate the
development of new location privacy solutions that fit the
needs of MCS so that the increasing number of such applica-
tions do not jeopardize their users’ privacy.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is a participative online activity in which the
undertaking of a task is outsourced to a group of individ-
uals [29]. This new paradigm of distributing a fragmented
task, is an efficient, scalable business model that allows the
cheap (or often free) massive collection of data. Indicative
of the growth of this data collection methods is the appear-
ance of over 2,000 crowdsourcing platforms [1, 56] in the
last years [83]. Furthermore, according to recent industrial
reports [40], in the last decade, 85% of top global brands
have already adopted crowdsourcing, and in 2018, 75% of the
world’s highest performing enterprises would use crowdsourc-
ing. For instance, Google [2], Microsoft [3] and Mozilla [4]
use crowdsourcing to build WiFi location databases.
A driving force of the crowdsourcing ecosystem growth
is the widespread adoption of smart mobile devices, which
enable users to collect geo-located data on their devices and
share it with central servers to attain a particular objective. Mo-
bile crowdsourcing applications (MCS) have millions of users
around the world. For instance, OpenStreetMaps [5], a map
generation project from contributed GPS points, reports 4.3
million users in 2018,1 with 1 million active map editors con-
tributing over 4 billion GPS points. Similarly, OpenSignal [6],
a popular network-measuring application, reports over 20 mil-
lion users.2 Safecast [7], a citizen science project collecting
environmental data, currently reports over 75 million mea-
surements from approximately three thousand users. Many
other applications are available [4, 6, 8–18].
MCS can bring great benefits for organizations and society.
However, the collection and sharing of geo-located data raises
serious privacy concerns, as demonstrated by scandals related
to the publication of data by fitness applications [19, 20] or
irresponsible data analysis by transportation companies [21].
Location data can be used to identify points of interest (POIs)
[49, 52, 64], infer users preferences, or de-anonymize anony-
mous traces [89]. This risk increases when considering auxil-
iary publicly available information [30, 63, 70], and persists
even when protections are put in place [77, 78].
Over the last decade, the research community has proposed
a vast number of LPPMs to address these issues [76], some
of which can provide strong differentially private guaran-
tees [28, 34, 48] and even offer optimal utility [33, 73]. Even
though it seems like the location privacy question is techni-
cally solved, the reality is that these LPPMs solely focus on
one use case. They are generally geared towards LBSs in
which users sporadically reveal their location in return for a
service (e.g., to find nearby restaurants). In this context, utility
is user-centric and hinges on the precision of the reported loca-
tions. In MCS applications, on the contrary, geo-located data
is often shared continuously and over long periods and, while
1https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Stats
2https://opensignal.com/methodology#over-20-million-
users-of-our-app
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the data utility is still correlated with the location precision, it
is foremost tied to the values of the measurements reported at
these locations (e.g., WiFi signal strength, or radiation level).
Moreover, MCS utility cannot be captured with a user-centric
approach as, by definition, MCS benefits from aggregating
data collected by a large amount of users.
In this paper, we conduct the first in-depth evaluation of the
effectiveness of LPPMs in the context of MCS. We use two
representative applications, Safecast [7] and Radiocells [9],
which make their contributors’ data publicly available on their
websites and which have very different utility functions. We
propose two new privacy metrics based on statistical measures
developed for binary classification and information retrieval
to capture the privacy gain provided by the LPPMs with re-
spect to the identification of areas and points of interest. We
also consider new utility measures that, instead of relying on
distance-based errors, quantify the accuracy of the aggregate
values of data collectively generated.
The results of our experimental evaluation on real data con-
tradict common beliefs regarding the privacy-utility trade-off
offered by different LPPMs. First, location hiding method-
ologies, which in LBSs help concealing trajectories [60], do
not bring any privacy benefits to MCS users. This is mainly
because, in MCS, the volume of geo-located data is larger and
contains points reported over long periods of time (more than
a day). Second, differentially private mechanisms [28] offer
good protection only for very strong parameters, and even
when they are optimized for utility [33], they dramatically
perturb the radiation measurements. For instance, in Safecast,
we observed that it tremendously changed some areas’ radia-
tion levels, urging people to evacuate a place, and completely
hindered the ability to localize radiation hotspots (location
with elevated radiation). Finally, generalization techniques,
usually dismissed in LBSs because of their poor utility, offer
one of the best privacy-utility balance in MCS.
In summary, existing LPPMs are not well aligned with
the needs of MCS applications. Therefore, new research is
needed to approach the design of optimal LPPMs based on
collective, value-based, utility metrics instead of user-centric,
location-based utility.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
X We propose novel privacy and utility metrics suitable to
evaluate the performance of LPPMs for MCS data publishing
patterns.
X Using real data collected from two representative MCS
applications, we show that existing LPPMs impose too high
utility price and that many of them do not even provide good
privacy guarantees in the context of MCS.
XWe discuss technical and non-technical countermeasures
to improve the privacy protection of MCS users.
2 Mobile Crowdsourcing Applications
In this section, we introduce the two crowdsourcing applica-
tions studied in detail in this paper.
2.1 Safecast
Safecast [7] is a volunteer-centered organization whose goal is
to monitor the global radiation levels and detect abnormalities
in near real time. Safecast crowdsources the collection of
radiation data by providing users with devices that collect
radiation measurements every five seconds.
Safecast dataset. This dataset contains 64.2 million measure-
ments from 608 users, collected from 2011 to 2017. Radiation
measurements contain the user’s name, a unique user ID, the
device’s ID, latitude and longitude, a UTC timestamp, and the
radiation value and units. No registration is required to access
these data and Safecast’s privacy policy3 states that to enable
flexibility “Anyone is free to use with no licensing restric-
tions”. For our experiments we removed IDs corresponding
to organizations, malformed entries, and converted all UTC
times to local. After this process, the dataset has almost 56.7
million measurements from 540 users.
Safecast utility. The Safecast project uses the collected data
to study different phenomena related to radiation. In this
paper, we consider two of the main uses of the data.
First, we consider the interactive map to visualize radiation
published on Safecast website. Safecast computes the visu-
alized radiation levels from the crowdsourced measurements
as follows. For a given region of interest, Safecast filters the
measurements within the region and computes the average
radiation at each location over the last 270 days. Second,
they discretize the area to 2.25 million grid points (1500 dis-
crete locations per axis). They create the displayed map using
nearest-neighbor interpolation on the averaged radiation mea-
surements associated to the points of the grid. The reported
radiation is measured in counts per minute (cpm), expressing
how many ionized particles are detected per minute by a mon-
itoring instrument. This use case, which relies on averaging
and interpolation, represents a setting in principle amenable
to noise in the data.
Second, we consider the detection of hotspots – specific
areas where radiation is above a pre-defined threshold. These
hotspots indicate locations where radiation could be harmful
for public safety. Once identified, Safecast might send experts
to perform on-site examination to better understand the causes
and consequences of such dangerous zones. Therefore, it is
crucial that the localization of hotspots is accurate.
2.2 Radiocells
Radiocells [9] is a community project whose goal is to provide
an open-source alternative to commercial, closed source, geo-
3https://blog.safecast.org/faq/licenses/
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location databases for cell towers and wifi base stations. They
also aim to provide raw telecommunication infrastructure data
for use in diverse scientific studies. Radiocells crowdsources
the collection of measurements via a mobile application called
‘Radiobeacon’.4 With this application, users continuously col-
lect measurements as they perform daily activities. Users
choose when to start and stop measuring, and when to up-
load the measurements to the Radiocells server. Furthermore,
they can select a specific area where measurements will not
be recorded, e.g., to protect their home locations. We do not
study the impact of this defense in this paper, but previous
work shows that it is rather fragile [57].
Radiocells dataset. The raw data uploaded to the server is
publicly available for download. It is licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported and ODbL
licences aimed at not restricting the use of the data.5 Amongst
other information, the measurements include: signal strength,
cell (antenna) ID, location, timestamp, and smartphone model,
software, OS version, and manufacturer. In an effort to pre-
serve users’ privacy, this dataset does not contain usernames.
However, the combination of the smartphone characteristics,
the location, and the network provider is likely to represent
a quasi-identifier. We downloaded data for 2013 to 2017,
obtaining 25 million measurements. To separate users’ mea-
surements, we grouped the measurements according to phone
manufacturer, phone model, country and network operator.
We obtained 998 potential unique users, of which we only
kept those that had more than 100 measurements. We also
removed users with spatial inconsistencies, i.e., we removed
all users whose speed between two contiguous measurements
was greater than 200 km/h. The dataset finally contains 568
users and about 4 million measurements.
Radiocells utility. Amongst other purposes, the Radiocells
data can be used to geolocate antennas. Such information is
useful to enable scientific studies about antennas distribution
and signal quality in specific places. Contrary to Safecast,
Radiocells does not provide documentation, nor provide code
indicating how they produce their map of antennas. Thus,
we use the location function described by OpenCellID [8],
another crowdsourcing project with the same goal, which de-
fines the location of an antenna as the average of the latitudes
and longitudes of the measurements referring to this antenna.
3 Protecting Location Privacy in MCS
In this section, we describe the existing LPPMs we evaluate
in our study. These LPPMs are designed for LBSs settings,
which are different than MCS in two aspects. First, LBSs aim
at fulfilling an individual need related to one user’s location
(e.g., find nearby restaurants), while MCS aims at fulfilling a
common objective through collaborative measurements. Sec-
4https://f-droid.org/packages/org.openbmap/
5https://radiocells.org/license
ond, LBSs can often work with sparser geo-located data (just
few points per geo-located query) than MCS, which requires
continuous data collection and in a larger volume.
3.1 Defenses
We consider three type of LPPMs [65,81]: (i) spatial obfusca-
tion, (ii) hiding, and (iii) generalization. We do not consider
the use of dummy locations or synthetic data [32,35]. Both ap-
proaches focus on producing plausible artificial locations, but
to the best of our knowledge there is no proposal that provides
the means to generate measurements (or other values) to be
associated to these locations. In fact, we argue that generating
fake measurements, even using prior information, is bound
to pollute the real-time measurements that these applications
aim at collecting.
Spatial obfuscation. The state of the art in spatial obfusca-
tion, which perturbs reported locations with noise, is geo-
indistinguishability (GeoInd) [28]. This mechanism adapts
differential privacy to location data, providing privacy guaran-
tees independent from the adversary’s prior information. This
approach is widely used in the literature [22,48,62,68,75,88].
Following the original definition in [28], we obfuscate loca-
tions by adding planar Laplacian noise. The magnitude of this
noise is controlled by the parameter ε= l/r which guarantees
that the ratio between the probabilities of two points being
the real location in an area of radius r is at most l.
Release-GeoInd. As with any differentially private mecha-
nisms, in GeoInd the level of privacy decreases linearly with
the number of reported locations. To address this limitation
we implement a mechanism inspired by the predictive ap-
proach proposed in [34]. This defense reports a new noisy
location if, and only if, the user has moved at least z meters
away from his previous location. Otherwise, it repeats the last
reported location. We call this approach “Release-GeoInd”.
GeoInd-OR. Remapping6 obfuscated locations to popular
places according to prior knowledge on users’ movements
can offer optimal utility without reducing privacy [33, 73].
We complement GeoInd with the remapping approach in [33].
We refer to this approach as “GeoInd-OR”.
Hiding. This defense achieves privacy by suppressing some
of the users’ locations [60, 61]. The released locations are not
perturbed. We consider two hiding strategies: (i) a “Random”
strategy in which users release a random subset of their points,
and (ii) a “Release” strategy in which users only reveal a new
point when they have traveled at least x meters away from the
previously reported location.
Generalization. This defense reduces the precision with
which locations are reported [31, 55]. We implement this
approach by reducing the precision of the reported GPS coor-
dinates [65]. We denote this defense as “Rounding”.
6A remapping g is a function g : R2→ R2 that maps an output z ∈ R2 to
another output z′ ∈ R2 according to the probability density function g(z′|z).
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3.2 Measuring Privacy
Location privacy metrics in the literature are mostly based on
a function of the distance between the real location of the user
and the one inferred by the adversary [80, 81]. This function
could measure the correctness of the adversary’s inference
(e.g. using, Hamming or Euclidean distances [81]), or the
uncertainty of the adversary regarding the user’s location
(e.g., using entropy [73]). These metrics are very well suited
for the case of LBSs, where users release one location per
query, and the adversary tries to infer that location. However,
they are hard to use in the MCS setting, where the adversary
has access to locations released continuously over several
days. In this case it is hard to establish between which points
to compute a distance, or across which points to compute
probability distributions for entropy-based metrics.
We also argue that the metrics above do not capture pri-
vacy in a manner understandable by users and developers of
crowdsourcing applications. How much privacy is an error
of 10 meters or 500 meters? It is clear that one is larger than
the other, but not how much privacy they provide regarding
the potential inference of sensitive information. Even more
complicated is the case of entropy, whose units of measure-
ment – bits, nats, or hartleys – are rarely known, let alone
interpretable, by layman people.
Privacy gain. We propose to quantify privacy as the loss
of adversarial inference power regarding two privacy dimen-
sions understandable by users: geographical area and POIs.
To quantify this loss, we use two well-established statisti-
cal measures: precision and recall. The former captures the
increase in privacy when, after a defense, the adversary identi-
fies many false candidate locations along with the user’s real
whereabouts. Here, the adversary has low precision ( T PT P+FP ,
where T P and FP refer to true positives and false positives,
respectively). The latter captures the increase when, after the
defense, the adversary cannot correctly identify the original
locations visited by the user. Here, the adversary has low
recall ( T PT P+FN , where FN refers to false negatives).
Spatial privacy gain. Spatial privacy considers the geograph-
ical area in which the adversary infers the user can be. We
define the true positives (T P) as the intersection of the areas
where the user can be before and after applying the defense
(i.e., the area inferred by the adversary that corresponds to the
user’s real location). Similarly, we define the false positives
(FP) to be the set difference of the area after the defense
and the area before the defense (i.e., the area inferred by the
adversary where the user was not present), and false negatives
(FN) as the set difference of the area before the defense and
the area inferred after the defense (i.e., the area where the
user has been but that is missed by the adversary).
POI privacy gain. In reality though, the geographic area itself
may not reflect users’ privacy [80]: if there is only one point
of interest in a large area, privacy should be low; and in small
areas with many POIs (e.g., a block in a city), privacy should
Table 1: Safecast (top) and Radiocells (bottom) measurements
per region. Vulnerable users are those with at least one cluster.
Region Users Measurements Average Standard Vulnerableper user deviation users
Tokyo 30 2,701,367 90,046 203,576 24 (80%)
Fukushima 104 7,765,773 74,671 260,671 65 (62%)
World 540 56,655,768 105,504 70,954 349 (65%)
World 568 3,710,547 6,532 17,312 91 (16%)
be large. We propose a complementary metric based on POIs.
In this case, true positives (T P) are the POIs in the intersection
of areas before and after the defense is applied. Similarly, false
positives (FP) are POIs identified after the defense that were
not present before, and false negatives (FN) are the POIs
inferred initially that are missed after the defense.
3.3 Measuring Utility
Similarly to privacy, in LBSs, utility is measured as a func-
tion of distance between real and obfuscated locations of one
user. This is unsuitable for MCS where location depends on
the precision of the aggregate of multiple users’ geolocated
measurements. We now introduce the utility metrics used in
our evaluation.
Distance-based. We call distance-based metrics those asso-
ciated to LPPMs in the context of LBSs. In our experiments,
we use the per-location haversine distance7 between original
and obfuscated locations.
Aggregate statistics. Most MCS providers are interested in
aggregate statistics computed over individuals’ contributions.
This is the case for Safecast and Radiocells, where the radi-
ation map, respectively the coordinates of the antennas, are
derived from average measurements of MCS users. In our
evaluation, we consider as MCS utility metrics the actual
utility functions of the projects as described in Section 2.
4 Existing LPPMs Performance in MCS
4.1 Experimental setup
We experiment on all data available from Safecast and Ra-
diocells. For Safecast, we additionally consider two regions
in Japan with very different radiation profiles: Tokyo, where
the radiation profile is quite uniform, and Fukushima, where
the nuclear incident at the Daiichi power plant [23] in 2011
created areas with elevated radiation. Table 1 summarizes the
statistics (number of users, total amount of measurements,
and measurements per user) of the regions under study.
We evaluate the privacy gain and the utility loss of an
LPPM as follows:
7Distance between two points on a sphere given their longitudes and
latitudes.
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Step 1. Adversary’s inference. Inspired by previous works, we
use clustering to implement inference on the regions and the
points of interest for all users. [36, 42, 46, 49, 59, 64, 69, 86].
Concretely, we use the density-based clustering algorithm
(DBSCAN) [46]. Contrary to other clustering algorithms
(such as K-Means), DBSCAN is robust to noise and outliers
and does not require to specify the number of clusters a priori
(see Appendix A.1). We keep the five clusters with the highest
number of points, and we consider their total area as the geo-
graphical area input to the Spatial Gain metric. Once clusters
are identified, we use the OSM API8 to find the POIs in the
clusters of the targeted user. We consider all points in the top
five clusters as input for the POI Gain metric. Table 1 reports
the percentage of users vulnerable to our attacks before the
defenses are applied, i.e., the percentage of users for which we
find at least one cluster. For Safecast-Tokyo, we only report
statistics for the 30 users considered when using GeoInd-OR
(see Section 4.3).
Step 2. LPPM Application. We apply the LPPM to all users’
data and repeat the actions in Step 1 to infer their regions and
points of interest. Note that when Rounding to 2 or 3 decimals,
obfuscated locations are separated by approximately 1,100
meters and 110 meters, respectively. Thus, our parametriza-
tion of DBSCAN is bound to not find any clusters. However,
an adversary would know that given an obfuscated point, the
actual location of the user is within a square of size 110,
resp. 1,100 meters, centered in the reported location. Thus,
for this case, instead of using DBSCAN clusters, we pick the
squares of the respective sizes around the five most frequently
reported obfuscated locations.
Step 3. Privacy gain. We compare the area (in square kilome-
ters) of the clusters before and after the LPPM to compute the
Spatial privacy gain, and the POIs inside the clusters for the
POI privacy gain.
Step 4. Utility loss. In the case of aggregate statistics, the
utility loss is application dependent. For Safecast, we consider
the absolute difference in cpm per grid point between the
radiation values on the application’s interactive map (see
Section 2.1), before and after the LPPM. In Radiocells, we
consider as utility loss the distance between the location of
the antennas before and after the LPPM.
4.2 Validating the Inference Strategy
We now validate the suitability of DBSCAN as strategy for
inferring areas and points of interest in the context of MCS.
Specifically, we test its suitability to identify workplaces on
data from Safecast and OpenStreetMaps. As both projects’
public data contain identifiable information about their users,
we can validate the inferences against information available
on other online platforms. We choose workplaces for ease of
validation, but we note that it is just one of many inferences
that could be done using location data [42]. Our results below
8https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Overpass_API
Table 2: Safecast dataset statistics.
Measurements Users Avg measurements Avg days
<10k 213 3,331 5
10k-100k 230 38,341 20
100k-1M 87 270,387 105
>1M 10 1,958,760 632
confirm that DBSCAN is a suitable choice as basis to compute
areas and POIs to input in our privacy metrics.
Ethical considerations. For these experiments we do not col-
lect any personal data other than that made publicly available
by the MCS projects. We have limited our inferences to the
minimum to validate the suitability of DBSCAN. We only re-
port aggregated or anonymized data such that no individual’s
data is exposed. We have notified the service providers about
our findings, and we have shared our code with them so that
they can make informed decisions regarding improvements
of the privacy situation. Our code is open-source so that it
can also be used by other crowdsourcing applications and im-
proved by the research community [24]. This procedure has
been approved by EPFL’s Human Research Ethics Committee
(HREC).
Safecast. To evaluate the effectiveness of DBSCAN in dif-
ferent situations, we split the users in the dataset into four
groups according to their amount of measurements they re-
port. For each group, Table 2 shows the number of users, their
average amount of measurements, and the average number of
days in which they took at least one measurement. From each
group we select as targets for inference the 10 users with the
most measurements that provide their real names. Since in
the group with >1M there are only 4 users with real names,
we end up with 34 target users in total. This allows us to
manually validate our inferences in reasonable time.
Identifying workplaces. We run DBSCAN on every users’
measurements during working hours (Monday to Friday from
9AM to 5PM). We configure DBSCAN to find clusters with
at least 80 points separated by 60 meters and, if no clusters are
found, we increase the distance by 30 meters (up to 120 meters
maximum) and decrease the number of points by 15 (down to
35 points). These parameters have been chosen empirically
to optimize the adversary’s success, see Appendix A.5. To
keep the manual analysis feasible, we only consider the five
clusters with the highest number of points.
We expect that the users’ workplace is one of the POIs
within the inferred geographic area. In many cases, however,
this area is large and contains many POIs. To ease manual
validation, we use X-means clustering [74] to split these large
clusters, and consider as POIs the centroids of the two largest
subclusters. We end up with at most 10 POIs per user. We
use the MapQuest API [25] to obtain these locations’ ad-
dresses and, if existing, the names of the businesses at those
coordinates. We recall that in our LPPM evaluation below,
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we consider all points in the clusters as input for the POI
Gain metric. This represents a resourceful adversary that can
afford checking manually all the points and filter out those
corresponding to businesses. We note that considering more
points could cause more false positives, but the semantics of
locations often makes it easy to filter these out, e.g., lakes or
parks can be usually discarded as workplaces.
Once we have candidate workplaces, we validate them us-
ing social networks such as Twitter or LinkedIn, or the users’
personal webpages. We note that 9 of our target users did not
have a publicly available profile or had too common names
to find their correct information, thus we could not validate
their inferred workplaces. Overall, we recover the workplace
of 35% of the target users. This result is consistent across
the groups: 40% of the users with less than 10k measure-
ments, 20% of the users with 10k-100k measurements, 50%
of the users with 100k-1M measurements, and 25% of the
users with more than 1M measurements. We conclude that
DBSCAN performs well for POI identification irrespectively
of the amount of data shared by the users. Surprisingly, this
means that privacy seems not correlated to the volume of data
made available to the adversary. On the contrary, it seems to
be highly dependent on the collection patterns of the users.
We observe that people fall in one of two categories: (i) Those
who travel to different places with the goal of obtaining mea-
surements, whose work addresses cannot be inferred; and
(ii) those who measure radiation during their daily activities,
whose work place we can find. The Safecast co-founders, who
are the top contributors in terms of data points, fall in the first
category, explaining the lower inference power for users with
more than 1M measurements.
Our results confirm recent findings in the literature re-
garding personal information inferences from location data
[42, 45]. Yet, we want to stress that the threat may be worse
for MCS, due to the volume of data exposed by participants.
For reference, Safecast’s lowest contributing group has on
average 3k measurements per user (see Table 2) while in the
Twitter analysis performed by Drakonakis et al. [42] only the
top contributing users (less than 0.06%) have more than 3k
geolocated tweets. Thus, even if the number of MCS users is
not as large as social networks’ users, we expect a significant
fraction of them to be vulnerable to privacy attacks.
Other POIs. A deeper analysis of the times and semantics
of the POIs identified by DBSCAN revealed further infor-
mation about Safecast users. Among others, we could infer
two users’ membership to specific organizations: one member
of the Scientology church who reported many points from
the Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre in a major city;
and a Masonic lodge member who regularly visited the lodge
headquarters. We could verify this information online for both
users. We also identified two work-related activities: a US-
based scientist working on a project about radiation around a
lake in the Southern part of the US, and a photographer work-
ing in a Japanese city. We validated these inferences using
Research Gate and the webpage of the artist, respectively. Fi-
nally, we could follow the education steps of a European PhD
student. Her points of interest over time reveal the university
where she obtained her master’s degree, an exchange with
another European university, and the university where she is
completing her doctoral studies. We verified these facts on
her CV available online.
OpenStreetMaps. Contrary to Safecast, OSM does not have
an open API for accessing users’ data. Yet, traces from users
who have chosen to make their data available can be easily
obtained from OSM’s website.9 To minimize the impact on
OSM servers, and comply with their non-crawling policy, we
manually downloaded data for 30 users with a large amount
of contributions,10 of which 17 used their actual names (or
indicative nicknames). Although the majority of the points in
the dataset were rather old (most of them at least 7-8 years
old), we were able to verify previous workplaces for 3 of the
17 users (17%). We note that, for some users, we found out
that they did not have a standard place of employment during
data collection period (e.g., students). However, for all users,
their POIs were within the area where they worked or lived.
We used this fact to infer two of the users’ short vacation
trips which we manually verified with information publicly
accessible from their social media accounts.
4.3 Privacy Gain
Defenses implementation. For the GeoInd defense, we
set the privacy parameter l = ln(1.6), and use radius r ∈
{50,150,300} meters which yields ε ∈ {0.01,0.003,0.001}.
Remapping the locations for the LPPM GeoInd-OR requires
computing the posterior probability for every candidate lo-
cation. This operation is rather costly when the number of
locations being considered grows. To keep a reasonable ex-
perimentation time, we only test GeoInd-OR for the Tokyo
region in the Safecast dataset. We use 80% of the users to
construct the prior probability distribution describing users’
movements, and the remaining 20% to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the approach. We chose this 20% manually to
keep a balanced testing set. It is composed of the top 10
users with many (more than 50k), moderate (between 10k
and 50k), and few (less than 10k) measurements. Finally, for
the Release-GeoInd mechanism, we use l = ln(1.6), r = 50
meters, and we select the distance between released locations
to be z ∈ {30,60,90} meters. We provide details about the
implementation of these LPPMs in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
We implement the Random mechanism tossing a biased
coin every time a location is about to be reported. The bias
is set so that users release on average 40%, 60% or 80% of
their measurements. For the Release mechanism, we sort all
the locations reported by a user in chronogical order, and
9https://www.openstreetmap.org/traces
10http://resultmaps.neis-one.org/oooc
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Figure 1: Safecast privacy gain: Spatial (top) and POIs (bottom). Amount of measurements per user + : <10k, : [10k,50k], N :
>50k. Each point on the graphs represents one user.
release a new location only if it is separated by (at least)
x ∈ {30,60,90} meters from the previously reported one. If
two locations are less than x meters apart but in different days,
we release them both.
Last, we implement Rounding by rounding to 2, 3, or 4
decimals the latitude and longitude of the users’ locations. Ef-
fectively, this reduces the location accuracy to roughly 1,100
meters, 110 meters and 11 meters, respectively.
4.3.1 Safecast
We first evaluate the privacy gain of the LPPMs in the Safecast
dataset. Figure 1 shows the Spatial (top) and POI (bottom)
gain for Tokyo, Fukushima, and the whole world. (Figure 12
in the appendix shows the results for each of the defenses sep-
arately for the whole world.) The x-axis represents precision,
and the y-axis recall. Each point in the graph represents a user,
and the markers’ shape indicate the amount of measurements
she contributes. The colors represent the LPPMs. To compute
these graphs, we configure DBSCAN to find clusters with at
least 75 points separated by at most 30 meters (roughly the
size of a small building). As in [42], we also require that, for
each cluster, users either stay more than 30 minutes, or visit it
for at least two days. A first reason to fix these parameters is
to evaluate the gain for all users under the same conditions. A
second reason is that the loose parameters used in Section 4.2
can yield very sparse clusters with few points that are hard
to break by removing or perturbing locations. Thus, the de-
fenses would perform equally bad and we would gain little
information about their properties. Tightening the parameters
reduces the work inference success to 21% (some clusters are
not found), which still represents a significant risk.
Defenses that provide large gains result in points close to
the figure axes. Points near the y-axis indicate low precision,
i.e., cases in which the adversary correctly identifies some (or
even all) of the true locations but also inferred many other
wrong locations. Points near the x-axis indicate low recall,
i.e., cases in which the adversary correctly identifies some
real locations, but misses many others. Unsurprisingly, we
observe a high variance in the defenses’ performance since
it is highly dependent on the user behavior. However, it is
possible to identify some trends.
We first discuss the Spatial privacy gain (Figure 1, top).
For the least privacy-preserving parameter (r = 50m), GeoInd
significantly decreases the number of vulnerable users (grey
points in the figure) from the values reported in Table 1. The
reduction is 50% for Tokyo (from 24 vulnerable users to 12),
45% for Fukushima, and 45% for the whole world. When
the mechanism is strengthened (r = 300m), GeoInd adds so
much noise (see Figure 10 in Appendix A.4 for reference)
that no users are vulnerable after the defense. In summary,
GeoInd seems to provide fairly good privacy gain in Tokyo
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and Fukushima. Yet, when we look at the whole dataset, it be-
comes clear that the protection provided by GeoInd is highly
dependent on the users’ movement patterns.
The Release-GeoInd (yellow) mechanism works generally
better than GeoInd. Even though more users are vulnera-
ble (only between 4% and 13% of the users become not-
vulnerable) and the adversary obtains reasonable precision, it
yields very low recall. This is because in this method users
keep reporting the same obfuscated location until they move.
This repetition results in clusters being found on fake loca-
tions that often do not overlap with the original ones. This
reduction becomes more significant as the defense is config-
ured to provide more privacy (larger z).
GeoInd-OR performs slightly better than vanilla GeoInd.
This is because the remapping results in points being repeat-
edly mapped to popular places causing the generation of clus-
ters around those not-real locations.
Similar to vanilla GeoInd, the Release mechanism (blue)
significantly reduces the number of vulnerable users – by
more than 50% even for the least conservative parameter.
However, when precision is very high, i.e., when a cluster is
found, it corresponds to a real location. The reason is that
even though the user hides many points, if a location is visited
regularly, the user will eventually report enough points around
this location to make the cluster identifiable by the adversary.
The Random hiding mechanism (green) does not perform
well. First, it reduces the number of vulnerable users less than
other defenses (10% decrease in Tokyo, 27% in Fukushima,
and only 5% when considering the whole world). From the
vulnerable users only a handful obtain good protection. We
could not find a clear pattern to predict which movement
profiles would best benefit from this defense. For many users,
especially those with a few points, removing points at random
still yields high precision as the few measurements are very
localized. Overall, we do not notice much influence of the
fraction of hidden points on the privacy of the users.
Finally, the protection provided by Rounding (pink) de-
pends on the rounding parameter. Keeping 4 decimals re-
duces accuracy by just 11 meters. Therefore, the adversary
finds roughly the same clusters, i.e., for many users we ob-
serve high recall and precision after the defense (especially
in Tokyo and Fukushima). On the contrary, rounding to 2 or
3 decimals significantly increases the size of inferred spatial
areas, which leads to variable recall (depending on the users’
movement patterns) and low precision.
Regarding the POI privacy gain (Figure 1, bottom), a first
observation is that the amount of users vulnerable to the attack,
i.e., points in the graph, is lower. This is because for many
users the identified clusters do not contain any POI (according
to the OSM API). Second, for the users who have POIs in
their clusters, both recall and precision are higher than in the
Spatial gain. This is because many of the large clusters that
contribute to the low Spatial precision do not have POIs and
thus do not contribute to the confusion of the adversary when
identifying particular POIs. Furthermore, the clusters that the
adversary finds after the LPPMs may cover a smaller area
than the original clusters, but still contain most of the users’
initial POIs. This provides a higher POI recall than Spatial
recall. Third, in this case we observe a significant difference
between Tokyo and Fukushima. The reason is twofold. First,
the Fukushima prefecture is much larger than the area of
Tokyo we consider. Second, Fukushima is a rural area and thus
contains fewer POIs than Tokyo where even small clusters
have many places of interest.
These observations reinforce previous insights that solely
considering the spatial dimension may provide a false per-
ception of privacy [80]. Considering a POI-privacy measure
is necessary for providing a comprehensive picture of the
privacy threat users face in MCS applications. We note that
this perception also depends on DBSCAN parameters, which
define the size of the regions found, and consequently the
number of POIs, increasing the manual effort of the adversary.
We discuss this effect in Appendix A.5.
Impact of the amount of measurements on privacy.
We present in Figure 2 the Spatial gain for the three best
LPPMs (all parameters combined) split by the amount of mea-
surements users contributed. We discard Rounding 4 as it does
not provide any privacy. We see that all LPPMs provide low
precision and recall regardless of the users’ contribution vol-
ume. The exception is Rounding which, as explained above,
by definition provides variable recall and low precision.
Counterintuitively, the LPPMs perform worse for users
who contribute fewer points. This is because the attack con-
structs more, and larger (on average 10 times bigger), clusters
for people who share many points than for those sharing
fewer points. These clusters are split after the LPPMs are put
in place, as some reported locations are moved away from
their original clusters while other measurements, perturbed
with noise, concentrate to new places forming wrong clusters.
For Rounding, where every cluster created after the LPPM
has roughly the same size, users with a few measurements
have higher recall because their initial small clusters are often
covered by the large regions resulting from the LPPM.
Thwarting workplace inference. Finally, we evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the different LPPMs at hiding workplaces. Re-
call that, without protection, we can identify the workplace
of 21% (7 out of 34) of the users. Five defenses, GeoInd,
Release-GeoInd, Release, and Rounding 2, protect all users
from inferences. Random hiding requires heavy sampling to
be effective (hiding only 20% permits the identification of 6
workplaces, and hiding 40% still reveals 1). Finally, unsur-
prisingly, Rounding to 4 decimals does not protect against
work inference, and Rounding with 3 decimals only hides one
workplace out of 7.
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Figure 2: Precision (green) and recall (red), depending on the
amount of measurements x per user for three selected defenses
(all parameters combined).
Figure 3: Spatial privacy gain (left part) and POI privacy gain
(right part) in Radiocells. Amount of measurements per user
+ : <10k, : [10k,50k], N : >50k. Each point on the graphs
represents one user.
4.3.2 Radiocells
Users in Radiocells have on average fewer measurements than
those in Safecast, and clustering requiring 75 points yields
very few clusters. Hence, for this dataset we loosened the
DBSCAN requirement to 25 points per cluster.
We see in Figure 3 that GeoInd-based mechanisms be-
have similarly to the Safecast case in terms of Spatial gain:
GeoInd provides highly variable protection, and Release-
GeoInd yields low recall while precision depends on the user
behavior. Vanilla GeoInd decreases the number of vulnera-
ble users by 14%, and Release-GeoInd by 2%. Given that
only 16% of the users were initially vulnerable, this reduc-
tion is significant. For the hiding mechanisms, the Random
and the Release mechanisms decrease the number of vulner-
able users by 7% and 14%, respectively. For the vulnerable
users, contrary to Safecast, these mechanisms consistently
yield high precision, i.e., they offer poor privacy protection
for Radiocell’s users movement profiles. Finally, the Round-
ing mechanisms with parameters 2 and 3 offer reasonable
privacy. Regarding POIs, we observe similar behavior to the
Figure 4: Measurement error in Tokyo using a distance-based
metric. This can be interpreted either as privacy gain or utility
loss.
Safecast dataset.
Overall, the results in Radiocells are consistent with our
findings in the Safecast dataset, confirming the trends regard-
ing the LPPMs behavior in the MCS setting.
4.4 Privacy-Utility Trade-Off
4.4.1 Safecast
Distance-based metric vs Aggregate statistics for MCS. We
first evaluate the utility loss incurred by the LPPMs measured
using the LBS-oriented distance-based metric described in
Section 3.3. This utility metric is based on the distance be-
tween reported and real locations, but disregards the (radia-
tion) values that Safecast cares about. Figure 4 displays the
results for users in the Safecast-Tokyo dataset. The y-axis
indicates the distance in meters, and the x-axis the LPPM
and the percentage of points that are released. Random and
Release LPPMs, which add no noise, are the best in terms
of error; and GeoInd LPPMs offer the worst performance
as they tend to spread locations — sometimes more than a
kilometer away from the initial measurements (see Figure 10
in Appendix A.4).
Next we consider the utility loss for aggregated statistics,
i.e., utility measured as the difference between radiation val-
ues to be plotted on the generated map. We plot per grid-point
utility loss for Tokyo and Fukushima in Figures 5 and 6, re-
spectively. We observe that the loss is similar in both regions,
though in Fukushima the median loss is slightly higher and
there are more, and larger (up to 104 radiation offset with
respect to the original value), outliers than Tokyo. Because
of the interpolation step, in this case all GeoInd variants of-
fer roughly the same utility loss on average. Still, Hiding
and Rounding strategies offer better performance, with small
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Figure 5: Absolute difference in Tokyo’s radiation values with
Safecast dataset.
median error for the least protective parameters.
If we compare the distance-based results (Figure 4) to the
aggregated statistics utility loss (Figure 5), we observe signifi-
cant differences. First, the interpolation step results in LPPMs
based on GeoInd to fare much better in terms of aggregates
than in terms of distance. Second, distance-based metrics un-
derestimate the utility loss of hiding LPPMs (Random and
Release). While it is true that the released points have no error
in distance, hiding points comes at a cost not reflected in the
metric. This is made evident by the aggregated metrics, which
show that the more points are hidden, the larger is the utility
loss. We note that relying on Markov mobility models such
as in [51, 81] could help interpolate the hidden locations. Yet,
this would not help recover the (radiation) values attached to
them and the utility loss would remain. For the generalization
mechanisms, distance-based metrics consistently report larger
median loss, but have less variance and less outliers.
In summary, distance-based metrics provide a very different
perception of the LPPM performance than considering utility
functions computed on the geo-located values, overestimating
the performance of some methods (e.g., hiding strategies)
and underestimating others (e.g., GeoInd-based LPPMs). We
conclude that traditional LBS-oriented metrics are inadequate
for measuring utility in MCS scenarios.
Semantic interpretation. The absolute difference in cpm of
measurements before and after the defense gives a rough idea
about the utility loss, but it is difficult to interpret. Is it sig-
nificant? What is the effect of outliers? Does reporting the
values after the defense have any implication on the danger
for human health? To answer these questions, we study how
the variance introduced by the defenses can change the in-
terpretation of the risk at a given location. To this end, we
rely on the cpm safety scale [26] provided with one of the
top-seller Geiger counters (radiation measurement devices)
on the market. This scale contains five categories:
• Category 1: 0-50 cpm. Normal radiation background.
• Category 2: 51-99 cpm. Medium level.
Figure 6: Absolute difference in Fukushima’s radiation values
with the Safecast dataset.
Table 3: Danger category changes after applying Geo-Ind
(r = 300 meters) in Fukushima.
Geo-Ind: 300m 1 2 3 4 5 Number
Original of points
1 79.7% 19.3% 1% 0.003% 0.001% 1,354,110
2 41.5% 49.5% 9% 0.023% 0.01% 650,486
3 8.7% 35.9% 52.2% 2.3% 0.9% 229,848
4 2.5% 3.3% 49.3% 29.8% 15.1% 10,489
5 3.9% 1.7% 34.7% 29.3% 30.4% 5,067
• Category 3: >100 cpm. High level.
• Category 4: >1000 cpm. Very high level, leave area.
• Category 5: >2000 cpm. Extremely high level, immedi-
ate evacuation.
We select the prefecture of Fukushima and two defenses that
produce a good level of privacy: GeoInd 300m and Rounding
2. For each of the 2.25 million grid-points on Safecast’s radia-
tion map for Fukushima, we compute their radiation category
according to the safety scale before and after each defense.
For GeoInd 300m, which is of probabilistic nature, we repeat
the procedure 10 times and report the average. We present
the results in Tables 3 and 4. We observe that the majority of
the points either stay in their original category or move to a
nearby. However, we observe some extreme category jumps
from the first category (safe radiation levels) to the fourth and
fifth (high danger). For instance, GeoInd causes 53 places to
be marked as dangerous instead of safe. Even more alarming,
283 locations that should be marked as extremely dangerous
are marked as safe or slightly elevated (categories 1 and 2).
On the contrary, the Rounding mechanism limits the number
of extreme changes. For instance, there is a category jump
from 5 to 1 and 2 only for 45 grid-points.
Why optimal remapping does not work for MCS. Even
though GeoInd-OR was designed to increase utility while
preserving privacy, we observe that, in the MCS case, util-
ity roughly stays the same (Figure 5), and privacy slightly
increases, both in decreasing the number of vulnerable users
and in increasing the spatial gain. The reason for this mis-
match is that this mechanism was designed in the context of
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Table 4: Danger category changes after applying the Rounding
mechanism (2 decimals) in Fukushima.
Rounding: 2 1 2 3 4 5 Number
Original of points
1 89.3% 10.3% 0.3% - 0.001% 1,354,110
2 30.2% 64% 5.8% 0.003% - 650,486
3 0.7% 22.6% 74.8% 1.6% 0.3% 229,847
4 0.2% 0.01% 43.3% 39.6% 16.9% 10,490
5 0.9% - 9.3% 42.1% 47.6% 5,067
Figure 7: Prior probability of visiting locations in Tokyo
(white - low probability, black - high probability).
LBSs, where remapping locations to places where the user is
likely to be is bound to provide good utility on average. How-
ever, in Safecast, the utility does not depend on the locations
themselves, but on the associated measurements. Remapping
the location, however, concentrates measurements in these
popular locations, effectively polluting the measurements. We
illustrate this effect in Figure 7, which represents the prior
probability of users’ locations over all locations in Tokyo (low
in white, high in black). In the low probability areas, most
locations have the same probability, thus remapping has a
randomizing effect. However, when there is a location with
high probability, all locations are remapped to this popular
location. We note that, while significantly hurting utility, this
effect creates artificial clusters that reduce the adversary’s
precision and recall, thus increasing privacy.
The case of high precision measurements. Safecast also uses
the crowdsourced measurements to monitor radiation hotspots
that could be dangerous for public health. For this case, lo-
cation precision is highly important, both to understand the
dangers it can cause and to keep low costs if experts have to
be sent to study the origin of the abnormality.
We study the impact of LPPMs on hotspot localization by
looking for locations with more than 100 cpm radiation after
averaging the measurements over the last 270 days but before
interpolating the data. This is to avoid that interpolation mod-
ifies the position of the hotspots, or even eliminates them. We
show the results of detection when using the raw measure-
Figure 8: Safecast: Hotspot detection for areas with at least
100 cpm. Comparison of various defenses vs the original
hotspots.
ments (top left), and after the application of Release-GeoInd
30m (bottom left), GeoInd 300m (top right), and Rounding
2 (bottom right) in Figure 8. We see that noise-based mecha-
nisms spread the measurements and, as the noise increases,
create additional hotspots. Thus, these mechanisms are use-
less for hotspot detection: the results cannot be properly in-
terpreted. Imagine a hotspot in a place known to present high
radiation, thus being already closely monitored by the author-
ities. Finding such hotspot is not alarming. However, after
spreading, the finding of hotspots conveys a much different
message, especially when they appear in zones that had low
radiation in the past.
Generalization such as Rounding 2, which provides a good
privacy-utility tradeoff for aggregated statistics, also performs
poorly. In this case, the defense causes hotspots to disappear,
potentially causing a dangerous situation if a high radiation
zone is marked as safe. We also carry out experiments with
hiding mechanisms and find that, similarly to Rounding, they
miss some of the original hotspots.
Safecast takeaways. Considering only the privacy loss,
GeoInd variants (except GeoInd 50m) and Rounding to 2
decimals seem to offer the best performance, while Random
sampling and Release’s protection is generally bad in terms
of precision, and also too dependent on users’ movement pro-
files. However, an analysis of the utility impact indicates that
none of the existent LPPMs is well suited for the Safecast
setting. The semantic interpretation results indicate that even
if two defenses produce similar average results, the outliers
they create can convey opposite messages. Furthermore, even
a slight addition of noise or generalization can hinder the
project’s ability to correctly locate abnormal events. These
limitations effectively prevent Safecast from deploying them
to protect their users’ privacy.11
11This statement was verified in communication with Safecast.
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Figure 9: Radiocells: Utility loss (distance to tower location).
4.4.2 Radiocells
Radiocells’ utility function is rather different than the one
for Safecast. Instead of averaging measurements associated
to a location, Radiocells averages all reported coordinates
associated to an antenna to derive its position. We show the
related utility loss for different LPPMs in Figure 9.
All GeoInd variants induce high utility loss, with medi-
ans between 80 and 400 meters, and with outliers beyond 2
kilometers. Surprisingly, in this use case hiding mechanisms
(Release and Random) have many outliers. After manual in-
spection, we found out that several users had inconsistent
measurements. For instance, a user was swapping her mea-
surements’ longitudes and latitudes in a random pattern. Other
outliers are caused by providers moving their antennas IDs
creating mixed measurements for a given ID. Furthermore,
hiding defenses also influence the number of antennas located.
In our dataset, we detect from 10.2% up to 18.6% fewer an-
tennas when the Release defense is used, and the Random
mechanism eliminates from 2.6% up to 13.7% of them.
The best mechanism in the Radiocells dataset is Release
GeoInd which offers on average lower utility loss than other
LPPMs and provides acceptable privacy. However, some an-
tennas might be moved over a kilometer away. The next best
alternative is Rounding 2 that has a higher median utility loss
but no outliers. However, as the goal of the project is to accu-
rately detect antennas in order to give individuals the ability
to geolocate themselves offline or to enable scientific studies,
a median error of 100 meters (Release GeoInd) or 200 meters
(Rounding 2) is considered too large and precludes Radiocells
from deploying them.
5 What’s Next?
In this section, we elaborate on technical and non-technical
steps to enhance privacy at smaller utility cost in the context
of MCS applications.
5.1 Towards Effective Defenses
We first discuss possible strategies to improve the trade-off
between users’ privacy and MCS utility.
An unexplored approach is the use of advanced crypto-
graphic protocols to compute the values of interest for MCS
without revealing the users’ individual values to the providers
[41]. For instance, users could use multi-party computation to
collaboratively compute aggregates and only report the result
to the provider. However, cryptographic approaches require
high computational power on the users’ side and increase the
bandwidth needs to perform the joint computation. Further-
more, this would limit the availability of raw measurements
for analysis other than those predefined by the cryptographic
protocols, which is at odds with the principles of open data
and open science defended by most of the MCS platforms.
In our evaluation, we only considered spatial generaliza-
tion. Another avenue to explore would be to also generalize
the time dimension. On its own time obfuscation cannot hide
patterns revealed by repeated visits. However, combined with
full de-identification and hiding of users could reduce the in-
ference power of the adversary. For instance, the MCS service
provider could release a batch of measurements once a day or
once a week without linking these to any user identifier. These
techniques would be cheaper than the use of cryptography,
but require trust on the service provider to properly apply
sanitization and protect the raw data.
A third research path is the co-design of defenses and ag-
gregation algorithms. In this paper, we have considered that
the output of the LPPMs is directly input to the utility func-
tions currently used by MCS providers. However, it would
be possible that the providers adapt their data processing to
account for noise, using statistical methods or machine learn-
ing, as done in fields that rely on noisy sensors [79] or train in
different settings from which they are deployed [43, 72, 85].
Finally, MCS could provide users with dedicated local soft-
ware (e.g., building on our evaluation method) to alert them
regarding the privacy dangers of publishing raw location data.
Such a system would allow them to selectively hide some
of their measurements, reducing the confidence of inference
attacks. We note that, when building such a tool, one would
like to consider attacks beyond the POI-based inferences con-
sidered in this paper. For instance, it has been shown that
co-locations can unveil social links [38, 44]. We run a pre-
liminary evaluation to learn whether our MCS setting is also
prone to such an attack. We identified 50 unique pairs of users
with real names and at least one co-location (similar latitude,
longitude, and time) in the Safecast dataset. We could validate
16 of these pairs as real friendships using information avail-
able on online social networks, i.e., yielding a 32% correct
inference rate. Note that many of the other pairs could not be
verified because either users were not part of any social net-
work or they did not publicly reveal their social links. More
advanced methods, such as measuring the amount of time
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two users are co-located or the number of different locations
where two users jointly report their locations [30,38,87] could
further improve these results. Therefore, new defenses need
to also obfuscate co-locations [71].
5.2 Privacy Considerations for Developers
In our study, we identified a number of issues related to the
collection and sharing of data that, even though cannot fully
prevent inference, could make inference attacks detectable
and could render potential attackers accountable.
A first consideration to make is the type of policy un-
der which MCS publish the collected data. While making
large datasets available to everyone for unrestricted use is
admirable, and certainly of high value for the academic com-
munity, it can have serious implications for the altruistic con-
tributors. To reduce this risk, developers could add clauses
to the policies that not only mandate that use of the data is
properly acknowledged, but also that it is well documented,
implying that researchers or other individuals have to disclose
how they have processed the data, and for which purpose.
Second, both Safecast and Radiocells datasets are available
for download without the need for authentication. This hinders
traceability of who has the data, and thus enables stealthy
attacks where nor the users neither the applications are aware
of the danger. Like in other projects that make data available
for research and other purposes (e.g., the Drebin project12),
these sites could require simple registration to maintain a
log of who has had access to the datasets. Together with the
previous requirement, which would include documentation
of sharing, it should help mitigate the risks.
Third, these applications typically do not perform any con-
trol on who are the contributors. This poses a particular prob-
lem when it comes to children. In many jurisdictions, chil-
dren’s data are subject to particular legislation [37, 47], and
in particular require the parents’ consent to be collected and
processed. The lack of control upon collection implies that the
datasets could contain children’s geo-located data collected
illegally. Adding control would solve this problem and also
support the previous two points.
Finally, the datasets we studied contain data from users
from all over the world. These users, therefore, are subject
to different legislations that regulate how their data can be
processed. While this may not be a problem for corporations
or criminals that want to exploit the datasets, it creates a
hurdle for researchers who have to obtain approval from their
institution for data processing. This problem arised during our
discussions with our institution’s Ethical Review Committee,
and almost caused us to stop the project. In other words, lack
of proper documentation may limit the free use of the data for
science, effectively hindering one of the main goals of these
applications. Better documentation as to the origin of data
and its use possibilities would greatly facilitate the process.
12https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/~danarp/drebin/
6 Related Work
We have covered the related work on LPPMs in Section 3.1
and the previous work on privacy quantification in Section
3.2. We complete this review of the literature with previous
research on human mobility and its privacy implications.
Similar to [36, 49, 58, 59, 64, 66, 67, 69, 86], our POIs ex-
traction attack is based on machine learning. Gambs and
Killijian [52] also rely on POIs inference to build mobility
Markov chains and de-anonymize traces. Gonzalez et al. [54]
and Song et al. [82] study anonymized mobile phone data.
Their results indicate that human trajectories have a high
degree of temporal and spatial regularity, and that an individ-
ual’s location data history is a unique identifier. De Montjoye
et al. [39] investigate how the uniqueness of mobility traces
decays depending on their resolution. They show that unique-
ness cannot be avoided by lowering the resolution of a dataset.
While these works aim at understanding the uniqueness of
individuals or de-anonymize them, we focused on inferences
that rely on labeled traces.
Similar to us, Gambs et al. [50] develop a platform for
evaluating various sanitization methods and attacks on geo-
located data. They focused on evaluating LBSs, while we
evaluate the effectiveness of defenses on MCS applications.
We also use different privacy metrics, and utility functions,
tailored to the MCS scenario. Finally, Drakonakis et al. [42]
explore the privacy loss stemming from by public location
metadata. They propose a tool to infer users’ regions of in-
terest and, by experimenting with data gathered from Twitter,
they illustrate the accuracy of their tool in pinpointing users’
sensitive locations. Furthermore, they highlight how the spa-
tial data provide additional context on the information shared
by the user. We use similar techniques to prove that these
inferences are also possible in MCS. For further information
about the security and privacy landscape of location data we
refer the reader to the surveys in [53, 65, 76, 84].
7 Conclusion
Mobile crowdsourcing is an increasingly popular way to
collect geo-located data from millions of contributors. We
present the first study on privacy implications of MCS applica-
tions. We study the applicability of well-established location
privacy defenses created for LBSs. We show that neither the
location privacy and utility metrics typically found in the lit-
erature nor the existing privacy-preserving mechanisms are
well-suited for the MCS case. On the one hand, given the per-
sistent patterns stemming from continuous collection, these
solutions provide less privacy than in the case of LBSs where
locations are revealed once. Second, the existing mechanisms
are optimized to provide utility regarding the location of the
users, but MCS applications rely on measurements associated
to these locations, or on some function of the locations. There-
fore, state-of-the-art defenses have a detrimental impact on
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the MCS utility.
In conclusion, we identify an underexplored space in the
location privacy literature, that is of practical relevance for
many new applications. We have outlined promising lines
to improve the situation. We hope that our findings spawn
new research that soon enables the deployment of privacy-
preserving crowdsourcing applications.
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A Appendix
A.1 Density Based Clustering (DBSCAN)
The algorithm receives as input all locations (also referred to
as points) reported by a user, the minimum required amount
of points per cluster, and the maximum allowed distance be-
tween the cluster’s points. It outputs a label for every point,
indicating to which cluster it belongs, or if it has been labeled
as noise.
DBSCAN starts by randomly selecting a point c. Then, it
finds all points p that are in distance ε from this point. Then,
from the points p reachable from the first point, it tries to find
more points q where q are reachable directly from p but not
from c. If at the end of this procedure the minimum points
have not been reached, it moves to another random point and
starts all over again. In order to use our locations which are in
latitudes and longitude, we converted the distance ε to radians
first. Moreover, we used a ball tree data structure to speed up
the neighbors queries.
A.2 Geo-Indistinguishability
The noise is drawn by first transforming the location to polar
coordinates. Then, the angle is drawn randomly between 0
and 2pi while the distance is drawn from
C−1(ρ) =−1
ε
(W−1(
ρ−1
e
)+1)
with W−1 denoting the −1 branch of the Lambert W function.
Finally, the generated distance and angle are added to the
original location.
A.3 Optimal Remapping
For the optimal remapping technique we follow these steps;
For performance reasons, we first round each location to 3
digits, in order to merge nearby locations together. Then, we
calculate the probability of each coordinate. Afterwards, we
convert all coordinates to a Cartesian system using their dis-
tance from the center of the Earth. A useful tutorial on this
can be found in [27]. Using the Cartesian coordinates we
build a KD-Tree for efficient nearest neighbor calculations.
Then, for every location where GeoInd has been applied, we
query all nearest neighbors in a region r′. This r′ is set to be
as the 99% percentile of the distribution that generated the
Figure 10: GeoInd noise magnitude for different radius (l =
ln(1.6)).
Figure 11: Safecast: Hotspot detection for areas with at least
100 cpm. The presented defense is GeoInd with 50m parame-
ter.
parameter r used in GeoInd. In other words, the user has 99%
chance of being remapped somewhere within this distance.
For all neighboring points, we compute the posterior and then,
we calculate the geometric median of those coordinates using
the iterative Weiszfeld’s algorithm. The geometric median
minimizes the average Euclidean distance and hence, return-
ing us the new, optimal (in terms of utility as privacy should
remain the same) location.
A.4 Defenses evaluation
We include three more figures to complement the defense
evaluation:
• Figure 10 portrays the CDF of the noise added by
GeoInd. This noise is added on all GeoInd variants (Opti-
mal Remapping and Release-GeoInd) and it is controlled
by either the radius (r) or the privacy parameter (l).
• Figure 11 illustrates the hotspot detection results when
GeoInd 50m is used. Even a slight addition of noise
spreads the locations, not allowing Safecast to accurately
detect elevated radiation regions.
• In Figure 12 we present the privacy gain results for
each of the defense mechanisms for the whole Safecast
dataset.
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Figure 12: Safecast: Privacy gain for each of the defense mechanism (whole dataset).
Figure 13: Precision and recall vs. clustering parameters for
GeoInd (r = 50m) in Tokyo.
A.5 Experimental results
Adjusting the clustering parameters. We now study the in-
fluence of the DBSCAN clustering parameters on our results.
We show the difference in precision and recall for GeoInd
(r=50 meters) when we vary both the maximum distance and
the minimum number of point per cluster in Figure 13. As we
increase the maximum distance between points and decrease
the minimum required points per cluster, the results concen-
Figure 14: Clusters’ size and amount of POIs per cluster vs.
clustering parameters with GeoInd (r = 50m) in Tokyo.
trate on the upper left corner of the diagram. This is because
as the parameters become ‘looser’, the resulting clusters grow
in size increasing recall (more likelihood of covering all users’
original clusters) but reducing precision due to many false
positives. Furthermore, increasing the cluster size increases
the adversary’s cost, as the clusters contain a larger number of
POIs (Figure 14) which requires more filtering and increases
the probability of having false positives.
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